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Preface 
 
This study was performed in response to a potential future need to assess and/or 
design avionics architectures for a Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (HLLV). It is recognized 
that this study’s assessments are in the context of an evolving Project. Several Project 
trade studies are ongoing and may affect the outcomes of this study activity. 
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Executive Summary 
A multi-Center study team was assembled from LaRC, MSFC, KSC, JSC and WFF to 
examine potential flight computing architectures for a Heavy Lift Vehicle (HLV) to better 
understand avionics’ drivers. The study examined Design Reference Missions (DRMs) 
and vehicle requirements that could impact the vehicles’ avionics. The study considered 
multiple self-checking and voting architectural variants and examined reliability, fault-
tolerance, mass, power, and redundancy management impacts. Furthermore, a goal of 
the study was to develop the skills and tools needed to rapidly assess additional 
architectures should requirements or assumptions change.  
 
After examination of multiple DRMs and requirement documents, high-level driving 
requirements were determine to be: 
 The avionics architecture shall be human-rateable, 
 The avionics architecture shall, at a minimum, be fail-operational after one 
arbitrary fault, 
 The avionics architecture shall, at a minimum, be fail-safe (for abort initiation) 
after a second arbitrary fault, 
 The avionics architecture shall be highly reliable to meet Loss of Crew (LOC) and 
Loss of Mission (LOM) for various NASA missions.  
 
It should be noted that common cause failure and backup systems requirements were 
not a part of this study as this topic was thoroughly addressed by a previous Ares 1 
study.  
 
Twelve architectures were initially assessed and six were selected for detailed study. 
The selected architectures include three self-checking architectures and three voting 
architectures with various levels of cross-strapping. Both bussed and switched 
architectures were also considered. Architectures were also chosen due to similarity to 
existing launch vehicle designs. The avionics of a representative HLV stage was 
modeled of each computing architecture for comparative purposes. Reliability models, 
mass models, and power models were developed based on existing LV data obtained 
from Ares 1 and other databases.  
 
Reliability analysis showed all architectures except one were at a reliability level of least 
0.9999 for short duration (i.e. 24 hour, preflight plus time to orbit) reliability but varied 
significantly (0.3576 to 0.6669) if a longer duration (i.e. 9 month,  departure stage for 
Mars DRM) was needed. For all architectures, the flight computers were the largest 
contributor to failure. Reliability analysis assumed all architectures to be 1-fault tolerant 
by design but the number of 2-fault cases varied from 21 to 160 depending on the 
chosen architecture. The reliability of the architectures is related directly to the level of 
cross-strapping in the various architectures.  
 
Power consumption was analyzed for each of the architectures and compared. Power 
varied from 1758 W to 1935 W or roughly 7% depending on the architecture selected. 
Voting architectures tended to score slightly better from a power perspective but this was 
not considered to be significant given the small change.  
 
Since cross-strapping varied significantly in some architectures, harness mass was also 
analyzed. Harness mass for the data network was the only harness mass considered in 
this analysis. The data harness mass for a generic LV stage varied from 16 lbs to 105 
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lbs. This was estimated to be between 2% to 9% of the total avionics harness mass. 
Bussed architectures tended to score best for harness mass but the change in mass 
(~89 lbs) between the various architectures was not considered to be a driver on a 100 
metric ton class vehicle.  
 
Lastly, a survey of existing vehicle architectures was performed from a redundancy 
management perspective. Approaches varied widely in both hardware and software 
implementations. It was also noted that synchronization and interactive consistency 
exchanges can be complicated and challenging whether implemented in hardware 
and/or software and should be carefully examined in any design.  
 
In conclusion, based on the analyses performed, all architectures but one are 
considered reasonable approaches for a short duration launch vehicle mission although 
some did exhibit improved robustness over others for longer duration missions and for 
multi-fault scenarios. In an actual launch vehicle implementation, assumptions (failure 
rates, power, mass, etc) would require validation and full systems level reliability 
analysis would need to be performed to verify requirements.  
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Purpose 
The purpose of the study is to assess potential flight computing architectures for a 
Heavy Lift Vehicle (HLV) and identify avionics performance drivers. A goal of the study is 
develop tools and skills to rapidly assess additional architectures should requirements or 
assumptions change.  
Study Scope 
The Heavy Lift Vehicle Flight Computing Architecture study scope included the following: 
 
 Study of the current DRMs and requirements to best determine key driving 
requirements for the flight computing architecture.  
 Examination of multiple launch vehicle avionics architectures to explore the trade 
space considering reliability, fault-tolerance, mass, and other factors.  
o Self-checking and voting architectural variants will be traded.  
 
The following topics are explicitly considered out of scope: 
 Backup-Flight Systems 
 Developmental Flight Instrumentation 
 Flight Termination Systems 
 Communications, Systems 
 Power systems 
Study Approach 
The following process was used during this study: 
 
 Review of applicable Design Reference Missions (DRMs) 
 High level requirements review to identify avionics drivers 
 Review Ares V “straw-man” architecture 
 Simplify the Ares V architecture and use as a basis for instrumentation and a 
baseline architecture for comparison 
 Develop candidate set of computing architectures 
 Various voting & self-checking configurations 
 Various types and levels of interconnect 
 Assess/Analyze Architectures 
 Fault tolerant characteristics (integrity, multi-fault characteristics) 
 Reliability 
 Mass (harness complexity) 
 Power 
 Software/Hardware redundancy management implementation options 
Design Reference Missions Requirements 
High level design reference missions and requirement guidance were reviewed from 
several sources including: 
 Proposed HEFT Crewed NEO Missions 
 MARS reference Missions 
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 Space Launch Systems (SLS) Requirements Analysis Cycle guidance 
 Constellation Avionics Driving Requirements 
 Commercial Crew Transportation Systems Certification Requirements 
 NASA Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems 
 
From this information, informal high level avionics driving requirements were derived to 
help direct the study team. Key driving requirements included: 
 The avionics architecture shall be human-rateable 
 The avionics architecture shall, at a minimum, be fail-operational after one 
arbitrary fault. 
 The avionics architecture shall, at a minimum, fail-safe (for abort initiation) after a 
second arbitrary fault.  
 The avionics architecture shall be highly reliable to meeting Loss of Crew (LOC) 
and Loss of Mission (LOM) for various NASA missions.  
 
The human-rateable requirement recognizes that the first variant of a heavy lift vehicle 
may not initially require human rating certification but eventually for crewed systems this 
is required. For reliability calculations, a 24 hour time interval was deemed acceptable to 
cover prelaunch and launch on-time for avionics systems. It was recognized that if a 
earth departure stage or kick stage is required for long duration missions that this 
duration may have significant impact on LOC/LOM.  
Flight Computing Architecture Overview  
A challenge in assessing flight computing architectures is to cull the set of possible 
architectures to a manageable set of acceptable architectures worthy of further analysis 
and refinement. A second challenge is to perform the architecture comparison in an 
unbiased way that allows for apples-to-apples comparisons.  
 
To reduce the trade space of potential architectures, a two step processed was used. 
First, a relatively large set of twelve architectures were considered. This included self-
checking variants, voting variants, varying degrees of cross-strapping, and switched and 
bussed configurations. All of these architectures were consistent with the high-level 
avionics requirements. Furthermore, the set of architectures analyzed deliberately 
included variants with similarity to Atlas, Delta, Ares and Orion architectures. The 
complete list of architectures considered was: 
 
1. Fully Cross-Strapped Switched Triplex Voter  
2. Partially Cross-Strapped Switched Triplex Voter  
3. Triplex Voter with Self-Checking Switches 
4. Channelized Bussed Triplex Voter 
5. Bussed Triplex Voter without Cross-strap 
6. Channelized Bussed Triplex Voter 
7. Fully Cross-Strapped Switched Self-Checking  
8. Fully Cross-Strapped Bussed Self-Checking  
9. Channelized Bussed Self-Checking  
10. Self-checking Processors with separate Busses 
11. Self-check Processors (high level network processors) 
12. Bussed Triplex Voter 
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From this architecture set a smaller set was chosen for further analysis. This set 
included:  
 
1. Fully Cross-Strapped Switched Triplex Voter (FCSSTV) 
2. Partially Cross-Strapped Switched Triplex Voter (PCSSTV) 
3. Channelized Bussed Triplex Voter (CBTV) 
4. Fully Cross-Strapped Switched Self-Checking (FCSSC) 
5. Fully Cross-Strapped Bussed Self-Checking (FCSBSC) 
6. Channelized Bussed Self-Checking (CBSC) 
 
The rationale for this selection was that it was desired to have a sampling of highly-
crossed and highly channelized architectures, a mix of self-checking/voting 
architectures, and switch/bussed architectures. 
 
To perform a fair comparison of these architectures, instrumentation for a representative 
launch vehicle stage was used with the various flight computing configurations. In this 
way analysis would not be biased by specific architecture implementations. The 
following instrumentation was used in comparing all architectures.  
 
Unit Acronym Unit Name Quantity Function 
RGA Rate Gyro Assembly 3 Provides pitch and yaw rate measurements 
INU Inertial Navigation Unit 3 Provides acceleration in three axes and angular 
rates for roll pitch and yaw 
DAU Data Acquisition Unit 2 Provides excitation/measurement for sensors for 
critical system control and monitoring.  Since 
there are only 2 DAUs, for sensor measurements, 
lower level redundancy is assume to ensure 
sufficient data integrity. 
ECU Engine Control Unit 2 Receives Commands from the Flight Computer 
(FC) for engine control and provides the FC with 
pertinent data for engine control and monitoring 
TVC Thrust Vector Controller 3 Receives commands from the FC to command the 
thrust vector control actuators to the proper 
position.  Provides the FC with pertinent data for 
TVC actuator control and monitoring 
MPS Main Propulsion System 2 Receives commands from FC to control flow of 
fuel and oxidizer.  Provides the FC with pertinent 
data for MPS control and monitoring. 
RCSC Reaction Control System 
Controller 
2  Receives commands from FC to control reaction 
control jets.  Provides the FC with pertinent data 
for RCS control and monitoring 
PIC Pyro Initiation Controller 2 Receives commands from the FC to initiate pyro 
events.  Provides the FC with pertinent data for 
pyro circuit monitoring 
HCU Hydraulic Control Unit 2 Receives commands from the FC to control 
hydraulic power generation for the TVC actuator.  
Provides the FC with pertinent data for Hydraulic 
Power system control and monitoring 
Table 1 Functional units and quantities 
 
Each of the architectures is depicted in the following diagrams. When elements in the 
diagrams are duplicated, they represent self-checking (redundant) elements. In the case 
of controllers (TVC, PIC, etc) only the controller’s interface is assumed to have self-
check redundancy when this is depicted. Some of the architectures have a Cross-
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Channel Data Link (CCDL). This does not assume a specific implementation although it 
is assumed that it is capable of performing fault-tolerant data exchanges and system 
synchronization. When a CCDL is not explicitly shown in an architecture diagram, it is 
assumed the CCDL functionality exists in the current interconnect elements between 
flight computers with the associated software for consistent data transfer and 
synchronization. 
 
Architecture 1: Fully Cross-Strapped Switched Triplex Voter (FCSSTV) 
Instruments/Sensors Effectors/Actuators
FC2FC1
Switch1 Switch3
INU1
INU3
INU2
TVC1
TVC3
TVC2
DAU1
DAU2
ECU1
HCU1MPS1
ECU2
HCU2MPS2RGA1 RGA3RGA2
Switch2
PIC1RCS1 PIC2RCS2
FC3
 
Figure 1. Fully Cross-Strapped Switched Triplex Voter. 
 
The fully cross-strapped switched triplex voting architecture consists of three single flight 
computers (FCs) and three network switches interconnecting with all the FCs, input 
devices, and end-effector controllers.  The FCs each receives messages from each input 
unit through each of the three switches and votes the received values internally.  For 
data from redundant data sources the FCs then vote the data obtained from each input 
device to obtain a single value for use in internal computation. Computed outputs are 
sent to the end-effector controllers from each FC and each FC sends three identical 
commands, one through each of the switches.  The end-effector must vote the 
commands received from each of the FCs to determine command validity. 
 
In this architecture, the system synchronization and any data exchange is performed by 
the FCs through messages across each of the three switches.  Two round data 
exchange for consistency is not required on input data since each FC has access to all 
input devices such as the INUs.  The simplex switches are capable of corrupting 
messages or generating invalid messages. This is mitigated through the redundant 
message transmission and voting at the end user of the data in the messages. 
 
Some form of switch guardian functionality is needed to make sure a single failed device 
cannot render all switches non-functional through excessive message generation. This 
can be addressed by connecting each data path to only two switches rather than to all 
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three. A separate Cross Channel Data Link for the FCs may be needed to address this 
issue, as well as to support synchronization.   
 
Architecture 2: Partially Cross-Strapped Switched Triplex Voter (PCSSTV) 
 
Instruments/Sensors Effectors/Actuators
FC2FC1
Switch1 Switch3
INU1
INU3
INU2
TVC1
TVC3
TVC2
DAU1
DAU2
ECU1
HCU1MPS1
ECU2
HCU2MPS2RGA1 RGA3RGA2 PIC1RCS1 PIC2RCS2
FC3
Switch2
 
Figure 2 Partially Switched Triplex Voter 
 
This architecture differs from Architecture 1 in that each of the three switches is 
connected to one of the redundant input devices or end-effector controllers, rather than 
to all of them.  The FCs communicate with all the switches so that messages can be 
received from all the input devices and messages are sent to all end-effector controllers 
from each of FCs.  Both input and output voting must be performed at the FCs.  The 
commands should be protected (i.e. CRCs) prior to voting so there is no unprotect time 
window for command corruption after the voting occurs. Command validity is then 
checked at the functional unit. The end-effector controllers act on the first valid 
command received. Invalid and/or redundant commands are discarded. 
 
Signed two round interactive consistency exchanges of input and output data between 
the FCs is required. The switches cannot generate messages on their own, and the 
switches are used to implement FC to FC communication since all FCs can 
communicate with all the switches.  The third switch allows Byzantine resilient fault 
tolerance for data exchanges between the FCs. Communication through switches is rate 
constrained or some other guardian functionality is implemented to prevent loss of 
communication due to a babbling end item.   
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Architecture 3: Channelized Bussed Triplex Voter (CBTV) 
INU1 INU3INU2
TVC3 TVC1TVC2
ECU2ECU1
DAU2
HCU1 HCU2
MPS2
PIC1
RCS1
PIC2
RCS2
MPS1
CCDL
RGA2 RGA3RGA1
BUS
BUS
BUS
FC2FC1 FC3
DAU1
 
 
Figure 3. Channelized Bussed Triplex Voter 
 
Rather than using a networked communication system like Architectures 1 and 2, 
bussed communications in a highly channelized (no cross-strapping) approach is used.  
Each FC can only communicate with the input devices and end-effectors that are 
connected to the bus to which that FC has access. Input data is received from one 
redundant source by each FC and then shared across the CCDL.  Two round interactive 
consistency exchanges of input and output data between the FCs is required.  Each FC 
sends the voted command to the end-effectors connected to the bus it controls. Exact 
match voting should be performed on output commands. The commands should be 
protected (i.e. CRCs) prior to voting so there is no unprotect time window for command 
corruption after the voting occurs. Synchronization of the FCs is implemented through 
data exchange on the CCDL.  From the perspective of the other FCs, failure of one FC 
results in loss of access to the avionics units on the bus it controls.  
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Architecture 4: Fully Cross-Strapped Self-Checking (FCSSC) 
Instruments/Sensors Effectors/Actuators
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Figure 4 Fully Cross-strapped Self-Checking architecture 
 
This architecture is based on extensive use of self-checking components.  Each flight 
computer (FC) is self-checking and uses the interconnection through the self-checking 
switches to implement reliable FC to FC communication. The switches are assumed to 
provide the fault-tolerant synchronization of the FCs and the system components. Only 
the controller in the input devices and the end-effector control units are self-checking.  
All self-checking components fail-silent on miscompares.   
 
The switches handle much of the functionality required for fault containment and system 
synchronization.  The switches generate and distribute the fault tolerant system time.  
Only two, self-checking switches are required because the following is assumed: 
 Switches cannot corrupt a message being transmitted by FCs, input devices, or 
end-effector interface units. 
 Switches cannot generate a valid message and initiate communication on their 
own 
 Switches provide the bus guardian function to prevent fault propagation from a 
data source 
 
The FCs read data from input devices through both switches and accepts the first valid 
result, since the path is self-checking.  The FCs both receive data from all the input 
devices. Input voting is performed on both FCs simultaneously and commands are sent 
to the end-effector control units by both FCs. The point-to-point communication links 
between switches and flight computers or functional units are assumed to carry CRC 
protection to detect any potential link errors that may occur during signal propagation. 
The first valid command is accepted by the controller.  The FC-to-FC communication is a 
single round exchange because the switches and FCs will fail-silent upon miscompare of 
message data. 
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Architecture 5: Fully Cross-Strapped Bussed Self-Checking (FCSBSC) 
Instruments/Sensors Effectors/Actuators
FC2FC1
INU1
INU3
INU2
TVC1
TVC3
TVC2
DAU1
DAU2
ECU1
ECU2
RGA1 RGA3RGA2 HCU1 HCU2MPS2 PIC1RCS1 PIC2RCS2MPS1
CCDL
Primary Secondary
BUS A
BUS B
 
Figure 5 Fully Cross-Strapped Bussed Self-Checking 
 
This architecture is characterized by the use of a redundant data communication bus 
with self-checking at the two FCs only.  There is no self-checking in the input devices or 
the end-effector controllers. FC1 is designated the primary (or master) and FC2 is 
designated the secondary (or slave) which operates in hot backup to the primary.  
During nominal operation, both FC1 and FC2 receive the same data from the input 
devices and use it to generate appropriate commands, but only FC1 is able to transmit 
those commands to the vehicle avionics system.  The bus interface for FC2 is initially in a 
bus monitor configuration rather than a bus controller configuration, and despite using 
the same data FC1 is using, the outputs are not permitted to be transmitted on the 
busses unless there is a critical fault that results in a switchover to FC2.  When this 
occurs the FC1 bus interface is disabled and the FC2 bus interface changes to the bus 
controller and allows FC2 to send commands to the vehicle avionics system. When FC1 
detects a mis-compare or another critical fault that warrants a switchover, the role of the 
primary FC is transferred to the secondary.  FC1 is not allowed to become primary FC 
again after the switchover to FC2 occurs, even if the detected critical fault is transient in 
nature. If a critical fault is detected on FC2, and FC2 has not become the primary, the 
ability for FC1 to transfer the role of primary FC to FC2 is inhibited.  
 
Both the FCs has access to both the communication busses, and the primary FC may 
communicate with the input devices and end-effector controllers over either bus at any 
time. The end-effector controllers accept valid messages delivered over either bus.  
Validity is determined through message format and CRC. 
 
Data is exchanged between the two FCs over a direct CCDL between the two.  This data 
exchange includes system control states needed to provide a bump-less switchover from 
the FC1 to FC2 in the event of a fault in the FC1 processor. Synchronization of the two 
FCs is maintained through the CCDL as well. The control system must be designed to 
accommodate the worst case time for switchover by being capable of maintaining the 
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current end-effector state throughout the period of no communication from the FCs while 
the switchover is occurring.  
 
Architecture 6: Self Checking Channelized Architecture 
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Figure 6 Self-Checking Channelized architecture 
 
In this architecture, each FC communicates with input devices and end-effector 
controllers over a dual (self-checking) bus controlled by that FC only.  All end items are 
self-checking, and one identical message is sent over each of the buses simultaneously 
for all communication. FC to FC data communication and synchronization is over the 
CCDL and not the buses. In the case where there are three input sources or three 
controllers, one source or controller is connected to both busses to makes sure each FC 
receives redundant input and can access redundant controllers. Input data is exchanged 
across the CCDL to make sure both FCs act on the same data. Input data is then voted 
by each FC individually and no exchange of voted data occurs. The controller receiving 
command messages from both FCs selects the first valid received. Output commands 
from the FCs are not exchanged since they are self-checking. Since the architecture is 
highly channelized failure of one FC or bus results in loss of access to all avionics units 
only connected to the bus or FC. 
 
These high-level architecture diagrams and descriptions depicted the basic topologies 
that were studied. More detailed dataflow of these architectures are given in Appendix A.  
Reliability Analysis 
For each of the architectures, reliability analysis was performed to develop the Reliability 
Block Diagram (RBD) models for reliability comparison and cut set analysis of all the 
architectures. Relex® was used as the primary reliability modeling tool with some 
analytical modeling to cross check results.  
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The failure rates for the functional units in the architectures were estimated based on the 
existing reliability databases of the avionics systems. The same failure rates were 
assumed for the same type of functional units, while the interconnections and topologies 
were varied for the six architectures.  
 
The reliability analysis assumed one fault tolerance for all function unit groups, namely 
more than one failure in any single type of functional unit group was deemed to be a 
system failure. For example, more than one of the three INUs or more than one of the 
two DAU would result in a system failure. In addition, only hard or non-recoverable 
failures of the functional units were considered in the analysis.  
 
It was assumed that for the flight computers or switches or buses, the self-checking pair 
consists of two flight computers or two switches or two buses. For other functional units, 
self-checking pair was assumed to consist of one functional unit plus additional 
hardware to represent a self-checking network interface logic.   
 
The reliability analysis was performed for a time period of up to nine months. The nine 
month mission was considered for two reasons. First, there are some mission scenarios 
that could potentially require an Earth departure stage that would require long mission 
duration. Second, by extending the mission duration, the relative differences of the 
architectures is magnified. This can be thought of as a measure of robustness of 
architecture to remain operational under a great number of component failure scenarios.  
 
RBD models were developed for all the architectures. Figure 7 shows the reliability of 
each architecture for mission duration from 0 to 9 months. Results were calculated using 
Monte-Carlo simulation with 1,000,000 iterations. Confidence level was set at 95%. 
From the graph it can be inferred that several architectures may be suitable for short 
duration missions but as mission time increases some architectures have a distinct 
reliability advantage over others. To first order, these reliability differences are the result 
of different levels of cross-strapping associated with the various architectures. Please 
note that the reliability of the system shown in this report is only for one stage of the 
computing system and, therefore, the reliability of the computing system of a mission will 
be the reliability of the one stage of the computing system to the power of three if three 
stages are required for the success of the mission.  
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Figure 7. Reliability plot for the six architectures. 
 
Table 2 shows the reliability of the various architectures for the 12 minutes, 24 hours, 
and 9 month cases. Several architectures (FCSSTV, PCSSTV, FCSSC, FCSBSC) show 
“9 nines” and “5 nines” for the 12 minute and 24 hour cases, respectively. Voting, self-
checking, switched, and bussed architectures are in this group indicating that it is 
possible to achieve highly reliable launch vehicle systems with each of these classes of 
architectures. As mission times increase the impacts on reliability due to the various 
topologies and hardware failure rates become more exaggerated as the curves diverge. 
Of the architectures modeled, the FCSSTV is the most reliable due to the high level of 
cross-strapping that improves availability and less hardware and thus a lower fault arrival 
rate than some of the other schemes. But it should always be remembered that 
hardware reliability is only one facet of a system design and other considerations (i.e. 
low power modes, backup modes, software maturity, etc) could ultimately lead to other 
architectural choices. 
 
Architecture/Reliability R (12 Minutes) R (24 Hours) R (9 Months) 
FCSSTV 0.99999999951 0.999993 0.666999 
PCSSTV 0.99999999939 0.999991 0.613596 
CBTV 0.99999999856 0.999979 0.464581 
FCSSC 0.99999999946 0.999992 0.648547 
FCSBSC 0.99999999946 0.999992 0.646730 
CBSC 0.99998621550 0.998334 0.357675 
 
Table 2 Avionics reliability of a single stage for 12 minute, 24 hour and 6 month cases 
 
Cut Set Analysis was performed for further analysis on the architectures. A cut set is a 
collection of the functional units such that, if all the functional units in that cut set were to 
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fail, the system would fail. A minimum cut set is a smallest collection of the functional 
units, which, if they all fail, causes the failure of the system. Figure 8 and Figure 9 show 
the results of the Cut Set Analysis.  
 
Figure 8 gives the numbers of the minimum cut sets for each architecture. In this 
analysis, the cut sets are the number of 2-fault failure combinations for each of the 
architectures. For example, in the PCSSTV architecture, a failure of SWITCH3 and a 
failure of ECU1 would result in a system failure (since neither ECU1 or ECU2 are 
controllable). But the same failure would not result in a system failure of FCSSTV due to 
the additional cross-strapping of the fully cross-strapped architecture. Thus the ECU1-
SWITCH1 failure combination would be counted in the PCSSTV cut-set analysis but not 
in the FCSSTV analysis. The cut-set analysis is one measure of robustness of 
architecture for failure modes beyond the one fault requirement. As expected, the 
architectures with full cross-strapping of components are having the fewest 2-fault failure 
combinations of the functional units.  
 
 
 
Figure 8  Number of 2-fault combinations 
 
Figure 9 gives the probability contributions of each of the functional units in the modeled 
architectures. The figure also shows contributions for cables and connectors, and buses 
or switches, depending on the architecture.  In all architectures, the flight computers are 
the largest contributor to system failure in the probability analysis. Therefore, improving 
the reliability of the flight computers would yield the greatest improvement in system 
reliability compared to other functional units.  
 
This graph depicts the rationale for choosing a highly reliable flight computer for a launch 
vehicle. In addition, the different distribution of the failure probability contribution from 
function units indicates different reliability improvement path for the architectures. For 
example, the contribution of switches appears to have much more impact for PCSSTV 
compared to FCSSTV and FCSSC. It should also be noted that the architectures used 
representative failure rates for each of the functional units but for actual implementations 
failure rates may differ based on component grade, screening, and other factors.  
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Figure 9 The probability contributions of each of functional unit  
 
In summary, reliability analyses, including Reliability Block Diagram, Cut Set Analysis 
and Importance Analysis, were performed on the architectures selected.  In order for 
comparison, the same failure rates were assumed for the same types of the functional 
units and the same failure criteria were applied to all the functional units. There is no 
significant difference observed between the selected voter and self-checking 
architectures at the first order, with significantly lower reliability for channelized voter and 
self-checking architectures. Different distributions of the failure probability contribution 
from function units indicates different reliability improvement path for the architectures. 
 
Additional details of the reliability analysis including failure rates, reliability diagrams and 
failure rate sensitivity analysis can be found in Appendix B: Reliability Analysis. 
Data Network Harness Mass 
For each of the architectures an analysis of potential data network harness mass was 
performed based on data bus lengths, connector and switch masses. The baseline 
analysis assumed a generic core stage inline heavy lift design with the similar core stage 
dimensions of the proposed Ares V heavy lift vehicle. This core stage incorporates an 
upper stage avionics ring; lower stage/aft skirt avionics ring; and a specific number of 
functional avionic units necessary for ascent to Low Earth Orbit (LEO). The functional 
units are listed in the Table 1. Lastly, no additional avionics or functional units for 
boosters or 2nd stage/payloads were considered for this analysis.   
 
During the analysis the functional units were positioned based on the Ares V functional 
avionic locations in both the upper and lower avionic rings. Each of the architectures 
analyzed used the same location for each functional unit to perform a comparative 
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analysis.  The only difference was the wiring positions for cabling and the location of the 
switches. 
 
In order to determine mass for wiring lengths, an assumption was made to use 
1000BASE-T Twisted-pair cabling (Cat-5, Cat-5e, Cat-6, or Cat-7) at a 100 meter max 
drive length for the architectures that utilized a switched network. The nominal weight for 
Cat-5e (1000Base-T) is 22 lbs/1000 feet was assumed. In addition, the second 
assumption was to use 1553 as the bus for the bussed architectures. The nominal 
weight for 1553 used in this study is 12.5 lbs/1000 feet. The nominal weight for a 1553 
connector, .0289 lbs, and the weight of a 1553 coupler, 1.5 ounces (based on shuttle 
1553 connectors and couplers specs), was used for the calculations. Once the cable 
lengths were determined for the architectures the weight was calculated using the 
respective ratios for switched and bussed networks. Results are shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Total data network harness mass contributions for each architecture 
 
In addition to determining the data network harness mass for the avionic architectures, 
the harness mass was determined as a percent of total harness mass for a 
representative HLV cable set (Upper Stage Instrument Unit, Aft Skirt Instrument Unit, 
and System Tunnel). The representative HLV cable set was based on Ares1 data and 
with a scaled systems tunnel due to its greater length. Using this approach a HLV cable 
set was estimated to be 1169 lbs. With this as the basis of total stage cable mass the 
percentages in Table 3 were computed for each architecture. More details of the mass 
analysis are shown in Appendix D: Mass Analysis 
 
Architecture Data network percent of total cable set mass 
FCSSTV  9% 
PCSSTV  3.65% 
CBTV  1.69% 
FCSSC  4.86% 
FCSBSC  1.4% 
CBSC  2.4% 
Table 3 Percentage of mass for the data network relative to total stage harness mass  
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Power Analysis 
In order to better understand the power consumption for each architecture, an analysis 
of total power was calculated based on the individual component (functional units, 
busses, and switches) energy requirements and the integration of those components. 
Table 4 displays the individual energy requirements for the components based on Ares I 
functional units, 1553 busses, and Ethernet switches. 
 
Device    Power (Watts) 
RGA  Rate Gyro Assembly  23 
INU  Inertial Navigation Unit  30 
DAU  Data Acquisition Unit  15 
ECU  Engine Control Unit  60 
TVC  Thrust Vector Controller  60 
MPS  Main Propulsion System  30 
RCSC  Reaction Control System Controller  87 
PIC  Pyro Initiation Controller  10 
HCU  Hydraulic Control Unit  365 
FC  Flight Computer  38 
CCDL  Cross Channel Data Link  18 
I/F  Interface Card  3 
SW  Switch  size dependent 
SW Port    1.5 
Bus Port     3.6 
 
Table 4. Power assumptions for functional units, buses, and switches.  
 
A straight forward power model was built using EXCEL. The model incorporated 
functions units, and switches or buses based on the architecture being modeled. Power 
was doubled for self-checking units. Switch and network interface power scaled with the 
number of ports required by the architecture. The computed power estimates for each 
architecture are shown in Figure 11.  More detailed information for the power analysis is 
included in Appendix C: Power Analysis. 
 
 
Figure 11. Power estimates for each flight computing architecture. 
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Redundancy Management Approaches 
A survey of existing flight computing architectures was performed to examine the 
architectural, hardware, and software approaches to redundancy management. Six 
different architectures were studied that included both voting and self-checking 
approaches with varied levels of hardware/software implementation. Table 5 
summarizes the information gathered on each of the architectures. More detailed 
information concerning the architectures surveyed is included in   
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Appendix E: Redundancy Management Approaches. 
 
 
 Architecture Type Synchronization Flight Computer 
Redundant Mgmt 
(FCRM) 
Sensor Redundant 
Mgmt 
X‐38 Quad Voter: Three 
Computers have 
Processing 
Elements(PE) and 
Network Element (NE) 
and 4th only serves as 
NE, Tested only in lab 
environment 
HW & SW: NE 
implements 
protocols for synch 
of PEs by micro‐
coded FPGAs 
HW & SW: Bitwise 
voting of exchanged 
output data in 
Network Element, 
Fault Detection, 
Isolation, Recovery 
(FDIR) implemented 
in SW. 
HW & SW: Bitwise 
voting of input data 
in Network Element, 
FDIR implemented 
in SW. 
Shuttle’s GPC 
(General Purpose 
Computer) 
Quad Voter: Fully 
cross‐strapped, 
complex bus 
configuration, 30 year 
maturity 
SW: Multiple synch 
points at different 
cycle rates.  This also 
serves as FCRM.  
Synch points have 
code/definition of 
fail‐to‐synch failure   
SW: All based on 
synch points, 
Outputs not 
exchanged. Some 
LRUs compare data, 
some do not.  Each 
LRU has a 
commanding GPC 
No input data 
exchanged and 
compared, all GPCs 
get all data from all 
LRUs, SW mid‐value 
selects input data 
from redundant 
LRUs 
Ares FC (Flight 
Computer) 
Triplex Voter: ARINC 
653 Processor; No 
cross‐strapping, in 
development stage 
Synchronization can 
be performed either 
by Hardware 
Redundancy 
Management or 
Software Based 
Redundancy   
Management       
HW: FPGA design, 
using synch pulses 
via signals on CCDL 
interface,  
SW: Application 
Software provides 
synchronization via 
CCDL message 
exchanges. 
HW:CCDL performs 
data exchanges, SW 
voting (bit‐for‐bit) 
ensures a faulty FC 
will be masked. 
Sufficient 
redundancy coupled 
with exchange 
protocol prevent 
CCDL fault 
propagation  to 
multiple FCs. 
HW & SW: 
Application software 
provides all Sensor 
Redundancy 
Management. Data 
exchanged in a three 
round exchange 
process between 
Flight Computers via 
CCDL.  
Commercial 
System A 
Self Checking Pair 
(SCP): Fully cross‐
strapped.  
HW: Opto‐isolated, 
clock driven 
HW: Bit for bit 
compare, critical 
faults FDIR managed 
by HW, none critical 
faults IR is SW 
managed 
Sensor Inputs RM 
outside FC system 
and SW mid‐value 
selects GNC data 
Commercial 
System B  
Triplex Voter: Fully 
cross‐strapped 
SW: Synch points, 
SW waits for synch 
message from other 
processors, if no 
response, logs and 
continues.  2 
consecutive errors, 
fail‐to‐synch 
SW: Select set of 
data exchanged and 
compared. Voting 
masks FC single 
faults 
SW: Sensor Inputs 
exchanged and 
compared 
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Langley SPIDER Scalable Voter: Fully 
scalable, Verified and 
Validated in lab 
environment and 
formally. 
Fault‐tolerant 
message‐based 
synch protocol 
implement by the 
network.  
HW: All RM is 
removed from main 
processing element 
into   HW units: BIU 
(Bus Interface Unit) 
and RMU 
(Redundant Mgmt 
Unit).   
HW: All Data 
Exchange, Compare, 
and Reconfiguration  
Management are 
within these units 
implemented by 
FPGA design.  
Orion   Dual SCP: Time‐
Triggered Ethernet 
comm, Backup flight 
computer, designed 
for human‐rate 
spacecraft 
 Fault‐tolerant 
message‐based 
synch protocol 
implement by the 
network (Time 
Triggered Ethernet) 
Two SCPs that fail 
passive. The first 
valid command is 
used by the network 
interface controllers. 
Inputs exchanged 
and voted.  No 
voting on end 
effectors. 
 
Table 5 Summary of redundancy management approaches for existing architectures  
 
Of the systems surveyed, it was observed that the hardware/software boundary for 
synchronization and fault management functions varied widely from implementation to 
implementation. Competing design philosophies exist for both architectural approaches 
and the hardware/software boundary. For example hardware-based fault-diagnostics 
and synchronization can reduce software complexity but may increase hardware 
complexity and hinder the ability to easily make changes. Some argue limiting change in 
itself is an advantage.  Others argue the contrary.  
 
The varied approaches to fault-tolerant computing indicate that multiple solutions can be 
reliably implemented, but the rationale of the architectural choices is unclear from this 
survey. As to the issue of what functions should be implemented in hardware versus 
software, this too is unclear. One suggestion from a system architect was to separate 
mechanisms from policy. For example detecting a fault may require a hardware 
mechanism such as a CRC check that requires hardware to be implemented in real-time 
for the fault detection operation; but the policy that defines what to do when a fault is 
detected is put in software. This is a logical boundary as it may be desirable to change 
policy in different applications or missions. For example on a crewed mission, abort may 
be appropriate after a second fault to ensure crew safety, but on a cargo mission 
degraded operation may be a more appropriate policy choice.  
 
Another observation from this survey was that fault detection, synchronization, fault-
tolerant data exchanges, and other facets of redundancy management are non-trivial 
whether implemented in hardware or software. If not correctly implemented and verified 
through testing and analysis, failure of these systems can lead to common cause failure, 
potentially bringing down all flight computers. For these reasons it is desirable to 
leverage existing proven approaches and implementer’s with fault-tolerant computing 
experience. More information on the avionics systems studied can be found in Appendix 
E. 
Conclusions 
Six flight computing architecture were analyzed from reliability, fault-tolerance, mass, 
and power perspectives. All architectures, but one, appear to be reasonable approaches 
for a short duration launch vehicle mission although some did exhibit improved 
robustness over others for multi-fault scenarios. Power and mass difference in the 
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architectures were not significant drivers. From this analysis, reliability of the various 
architectures started to diverge significantly after about 20 days. This implies use of 
these architectures for longer duration missions would require further scrutiny.  In an 
actual launch vehicle implementation, assumptions (failure rates, power, mass, etc) 
would require validation and full systems level reliability analysis would need to be 
performed to verify requirements. 
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Appendix A: Architecture Data Flows 
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This appendix includes diagrams and data flow descriptions to help illustrate how the different 
architectures function.  In each case, if there is an existing system using this architecture, or a 
similar implementation, the system is identified and the functional description draws significantly 
from the way that system is operated.   
Fully Cross-Strapped Self-Checking Architecture (Orion-like) 
 
 
Figure A- 1. Diagram of Fully Cross-Strapped Self-Checking Architecture 
 
The following assumptions apply to the architecture in Figure A-1; 
1) Flight Computers (FC) are self-checking 
2) Switches are self-checking 
3) Only the controller in the input devices and end-effector controllers are self-checking, i.e. 
Navigation Sensors are not duplicated in each INU and TVC actuators are not duplicated for 
TVC effectors 
4) Data integrity on links is assumed to be by CRC (links are not duplicated and checked).  
5) Only 2 switches are required since it is assumed that Switches 
a) cannot corrupt a message in transit  
b) cannot generate a valid message on its own  
c) provide guardian against fault propagation from data source. 
6) Switches can be used for reliable FC to FC communications.  
7) Switches with network end-points are assumed to provide fault-tolerant synch capability (this 
is consistent with the Orion approach) 
8) DAUs are assumed to have self-checking or sufficient redundant sensor to ensure data 
integrity in 1 of 2 operation. 
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Figure A- 2. Flow diagram for data from input devices to FC1 
 
Data flow when FC1 reads data from an INU is shown in Figure A-2.  Reading of data from each 
input device is performed sequentially by each FC.  Data flow for input devices to FC2 is shown 
in Figure A-3. In Orion the INU values received at the switches are routed out to both FC1 and 
FC2, so both FC receive the same INU three values. If there are only 2 input devices (i.e. 
DAUs) it is assumed that 1 of 2 is needed therefore one DAU must supply sufficient knowledge 
to make a decision in the presence of fault. This can be accomplished with self-checking or 
triplex sensors within the DAU.  
 
 
Figure A- 3. Flow diagram for data from input devices to FC1 
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After receiving data from the INUs and other input devices, the FCs vote the inputs in 
application software and generate commands as shown in Figure A-4.  Each FC performs a self 
check on the control command before sending it out.  The end effectors, such as the TVC 
receive a command from each FC as shown in Figures A-5 and A-6.  The TVC will self-check 
the commands before using, but uses the first valid command received if on FC fails silent. 
 
Figure A- 4. Voting Input Data at the FCs 
 
 
 
Figure A- 5. FC1 sends commands to the end effectors 
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Figure A- 6. FC 2 sends commands to the end effectors 
 
The FCs communicate with each other through the switches.  Both switches are used and the 
receiving FC can use the first valid data received since it cannot be modified by the switches 
and the switches are unable to generate valid messages on their own.  See Figure A-7 for an 
illustration of this communication. 
 
 
 Figure A- 7. The FCs communicate through the switches  
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Fully Cross-Strapped Switched Voter 
 
Figure A- 8. Diagram of the Fully Cross-Strapped Switched Voter 
 
 
The following assumptions apply to the architecture shown in Figure A-8; 
1) Input voting occurs at FCs 
2) Output voting occurs at the effector’s controller 
3) Switches may corrupt a message or generate an invalid message 
4) Some switch guardian functionality is required to ensure a single input device cannot 
render all switches non-functional by continuously sending messages or babbling. This 
can be addressed by connecting each input to only 2 switches, but the same problem 
can exist on the FC side. From a practical stand point a separate Cross Channel Data 
Link (CCDL) may be desired to address this issue as well as synch. 
5) Two round interactive consistency exchanges assumed 
6) Synch performed with switches and FCs (may be desirable to have separate CCDL, see 
note 4)  
 
Data is received from input devices through each switch.  This means that FC1 gets three INU1 
data messages, one from each switch.   FC2 and FC3 also receive three messages from each 
switch.  This is illustrated in Figures A-9 and A-10.  Once all the data messages are received, 
the data is voted internally by the FCs.  Since each FC has paths to each INU or other data 
input device, there is not a requirement for cross-channel data exchange between FCs on input 
data. 
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Figure A- 9. FC1 data input flow 
 
 
Figure A- 10. FC2 Data receipt 
 
 
Once the data is voted it can be exchanged between the FCs through the switches to implement 
a CCDL for interactive consistency.  Likewise, after commands are formulated, they will also be 
exchanged prior to sending out in order to provide a consistent command from all three FCs.  In 
this case, since simpler switches are assumed, not high integrity switches, it may be desirable 
to implement a separate high integrity CCDL between the FCs for data exchange. 
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Figure A- 11. FC to FC data exchange 
 
After the commands are formulated and the necessary exchanges are performed, the 
commands are sent to the end effectors via all three switches, as shown in Figures A-12 and A-
13.  The commands received are can be voted by the end effectors as long as two of three 
consistent commands are received. 
 
 
Figure A- 12.  Command data flow from FC1 
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Figure A- 13. Command data flow from FC2 
 
 
 
Figure A- 14. Command data flow from FC3 
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Self Checking Cross-Strapped Bus Master/Slave Architecture (Atlas-like) 
 
 
 
Figure A- 15. Diagram of the Self Checking Cross-Strapped Bus Master/Slave architecture 
 
The assumptions for the architecture shown in Figure A-15 are as follows; 
1) FCs are self checking 
2) No self checking in controllers  
3) Data integrity on links is assumed to be by CRC (links are not duplicate and checked).  
4) FC to FC communication is through the CCDL and not the busses. 
5) DAUs are assumed to have sufficient redundant sensor to ensure data integrity in 1 of 2 
operation. 
6) Bus A and Bus B both carry data and commands to end effectors during nominal 
operations. 
7) Miscompare or other critical fault causes FC1 or FC2 to fail itself.  If FC1 fails, 
switchover to FC2 occurs.  Cannot switch back to FC1, even if fault is transient. 
8) CCDL data includes FC health/state data for telemetry (both transmit to the other), 
timing and sequence phase, specific parameters related to flight control. These are 
updated each minor frame.   Vehicle attitude and navigation data is NOT included.  
 
 
The Master FC, always starts as FC1, communicates with the data input devices over both 
of the busses, while FC2 monitors the bus for the received data.  FC2 is in hot backup and 
receives the same data as FC1 from the data input devices. Internally, FC2 believes it is 
controlling the communication bus as it is operating in a hot standby configuration with its 
BIU transmitter disabled as long as FC1 is operating nominally with no mis-compares.   As 
shown in Figures A-16 and A-17, FC1 can communicate with input devices over both 
busses and may use one bus exclusively for a particular input device, unless that bus fails. 
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For instance, with fault free busses, INU1 nominally communicates over Buss A.  INU2 
would communicate over Bus B and INU3 would communicate over either Bus A or Bus B 
with a selection to divide overall system communication between the two.   
 
 
Figure A- 16. Data input flow to FC1 
 
 
 
Figure A- 17. Data input flow to FC2 
 
Once all the input data is received each FC votes the inputs internally and performs a self check 
of the results (see Figure A-18).  In a fault free case, FC1 is the master and sends out the 
commands if they pass the internal self check.  FC2 only sends commands in the event of a 
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critical fault that causes FC1 to fail silent.  Figures A-19 and A-20 illustrate the command flow in 
each case respectively.  CCDL data includes FC health/state data for telemetry (both transmit to 
the other), timing and sequence phase, specific parameters related to flight control. These are 
updated each minor frame.   Vehicle attitude and navigation data is not required to be included.  
See Figure A-21 for cross channel communication. 
 
 
 
Figure A- 18. Voting of received data 
 
 
 
Figure A- 19. FC1 sends commands when it is Master 
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Figure A- 20. FC2 Sends commands when FC1 fails silent 
 
 
 
Figure A- 21. Cross channel communications 
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Partially Switched Triplex Voter 
 
 
Figure A- 22. Diagram of the Partially Switched Triplex Voter 
 
 
The assumptions for the architecture depicted in Figure A-22 are; 
1) Input voting occurs at FCs 
2) Output voting occurs at the FCs  
3) Communication between FCs and end items uses CRCs that are not affected by 
processing through the switches 
4) Switches cannot generate commands 
5) Two round interactive consistency exchanges assumed 
6) FC to FC communication is through switches, there is no additional CCDL 
7) Communication through switches is rate constrained or some other guardian 
functionality to prevent loss of communication due to a babbling end item.  
 
Figure A- 23. Input data flow to FC1 
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The data from input devices is read through the switch to which it is connected.  All FCs have 
access to each of the three switches.  See Figure A-23 and A-24 for examples of data flow from 
input devices to the FCs.  Two round data exchange is used to ensure consistency.  The FCs 
use the connections through the switches for data exchange and synchronization as shown in 
Figure A-25. 
 
 
Figure A- 24. Input data flow to FC2 
 
Figure 
A- 25. FC to FC communication 
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Figure A- 26. Individual FCs process inputs and generate  commands 
 
 
After the data exchange, the individual FCs process the data and generate commands.  The 
commands must be exchanged and voted (See  Figures A-26 and A-27).  The voted commands 
are sent to the end effector controllers via the switch connected to that controller.  Each one 
receives three commands, one from each computer.  As shown in Figures A-28 and A-29, the 
end effector controllers can use the first valid command received since the FCs voted the 
outputs prior to sending them. 
 
 
 
Figure A- 27. FCs exchange commands and then vote 
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Figure A- 28. Data Flow for commands to TVC1 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A- 29. Data Flow for Commands to TVC2 
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Bussed Triplex Voter (vote at FCs) Ares/Delta-like 
 
For the architecture depicted in A-30, the following assumptions apply 
1) Input voting occurs at FCs 
2) Output voting occurs at the FCs  
3) Two round interactive consistency exchanges assumed 
4) Data exchange and synchronization is performed through the CCDL 
5) Integrity of commands must be ensured with a CRC and other mechanisms (i.e. 
sequence number, timestamp, source id, etc) after the output vote. 
 
 
Figure A- 30. Bussed Triplex voter 
 
For input data, each FC communicates only with the data input device connected to the bus it 
controls (See Figure A-31).  The received data is exchanged through the CCDL so each FC has 
a copy of all received data and it is verified all FCs are using the same data.  This is shown in 
Figure A-32. The data is voted by the individual FCs after the exchange 
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Figure A- 31. Input Data Flow 
 
 
 
Figure A- 32. Data exchange via CCDL 
 
 
HLV Avionics Flight Computing Architecture Study – 2011 
 
 
47 of 88 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A- 33. Data processing and command generation. 
 
After the data is voted and processed internally, each FC generates a command.  The 
commands are exchanged via CCDL and voted internally after it is verified each FC has the 
same set of commands.  Figures A-33 and A-34 show this data flow.   Figure A-35 depicts the 
flow of commands from each FC to the end effectors on the data bus they control. 
 
Figure A- 34.  Command exchange and voting 
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Figure A- 35. Command data flow 
 
 
 
Self Checking Channelized Architecture 
 
The assumptions for the architecture depicted in Figure A-36 are as follows; 
 
1) FCs are self checking 
2) Self checking in controllers 
3) Dual buses send two copies of data 
4) FC to FC communication is through the CCDL and not the busses. 
5) DAUs are assumed to have sufficient redundant sensor to ensure data integrity in 1 of 2 
operation. 
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Figure A- 36. Diagram of the Self-Checking Channelized Architecture 
 
 
The FCs communicate with data input devices that are connected to the busses they control.  
Each FC controls a dual redundant bus, and can only communicate with end items on the bus it 
controls.  The data input flow for FC1 and FC2 are shown in Figure A-37 and A-38.  The FCs do 
not have access to all three data input devices.  FC1 can communicate with INU1 and INU2 
only.  FC2 can communicate with INU2 and INU3 only. 
 
 
 
Figure A- 37.  Data input to FC1 
 
 
HLV Avionics Flight Computing Architecture Study – 2011 
 
 
50 of 88 
 
 
Figure A- 38. Data Input to FC2 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A- 39. Data exchange between FCs 
 
The FCs exchange data via a cross channel data link to provide each FC with a copy of all the 
data received.  Once each FC has a copy of all the data, each FC votes the input data.  This 
data flow is shown in Figure A-39 and A-40 
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Figure A- 40. Data is internally voted by the FCs. 
 
Each FC then processes the data and generates commands.  The commands are self-checked 
by each FC before sending out to the end effector controllers.  The FCs do not exchange 
commands.  Command data flow is depicted in Figure A-42 and A-43.  FC1 sends commands to 
TVC1 and TVC2.  FC2 Sends commands to TVC2 and TVC3.  Since TVC2 gets commands 
from both  FCs, it can choose to use the first valid set of commands received.  The end effector 
controllers self check commands received from the bus when two valid commands are received.  
The controllers will accept a valid command from one bus if the other communication path has 
failed. 
 
 
Figure A- 41. Each FC processes data and generates commands 
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Figure A- 42. FC1 command data flow 
 
 
Figure A- 43. FC2 command data flow 
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Cross Channel Data Link (CCDL) Functionality 
 
This section describes the typical data transfer and synchronization capability of a Cross 
Channel Data Link (CCDL). The depicted transfers represent an architecture and protocol that 
would be fault-tolerant for one asymmetric fault.  
Clock Synchronization Transfers 
 
 
Figure A- 44. Typical network topology. 
 
 
 
Figure A- 45. Clock synch messages are periodically sent out. 
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Figure A- 46. Interfaces perform mid-value select on the three times. 
 
 
 
Figure A- 47. Redundancy Management Units perform mid-value select on times. 
 
Reliable Data Transfer 
 
The following data transfers show one method of delivering consistent data between flight 
computers in the presence of a single fault. 
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Figure A- 48. Flight computer data is forwarded to RMUs. 
 
 
 
 
Figure A- 49. Values messages are forwarded to other flight computers. 
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Figure A- 50. Data from different paths is voted and the majority is sent on. 
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Reliability Analysis Scope 
This Appendix documents the reliability engineering methodology developed for reliability 
comparison and reliability improvement recommendations on the flight computing architectures 
for heavy lift launch vehicles. The reliability analyses performed in this study include Reliability 
Block Diagram analysis, Cut Set Analysis, and Importance Analysis.  
Reliability Assumptions 
Failure Rates: The failure rates for the functional units in the architectures were estimated 
based on the existing reliability databases of the avionics systems. The same failure rates were 
assumed for the same type of functional units, interconnects, and topologies for the six 
architectures. Table B-1 summarizes the failure rates used for this reliability study. 
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Unit Acronym & Name Failure Rate (λ)@ 1-HR 
Data Bus (1553) 1.26E-07 
DAU-Data Acquisition Unit 1.67E-05 
ECU-Engine Control Unit 4.18E-05 
FC-Flight Computer 3.33E-05 
HCU-Hydraulic Control Unit 4.00E-05 
INU-Inertial Navigation Unit 2.00E-05 
MPS-Main Propulsion System 1.25E-05 
PIC-Pyro Initiation Controller 5.00E-05 
RCSC-Reaction Control System 
Controller 
1.25E-05 
RGA-Rate Gyro Assembly 2.00E-05 
TVC-Thrust Vector Controller 2.00E-06 
Switch 5.04E-06 
CCDL 2.00E-06 
Self-Checking logic 1.00E-06 
Cables + 2 38999 Connectors 1.30E-06 
 
Table B- 1. Failure Rates of the Functional Units 
 
Fault tolerance: The reliability analysis assumed one fault tolerance for all function unit groups, 
namely more than one failure in any single type of functional unit group was deemed to be a 
system failure. For example, more than one of the three INUs or more than one of the two DAU 
would result in a system failure. In addition, only hard or non-recoverable failures of the 
functional units were considered in the analysis.  
 
Self-checking Pair Configuration: It was assumed that, for the flight computers or switches or 
buses, the self-checking pair consists of two flight computers or two switches or two buses. For 
other functional units, self-checking pair was assumed to consist of one functional unit plus a 
self-checking logic.  
 
Mission Duration: The reliability analysis was performed for a time period of up to nine months 
for mission scenarios that could potentially require an Earth departure stage that would require 
long mission duration.   
Reliability Block Diagram Analysis 
 
A Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) is a pictorial representation of a system’s reliability 
performance. The RBD demonstrates a logical connection of (functioning) assemblies needed 
for system success. The assemblies are comprised of multiple components. The particular 
assemblies identified by the RBD blocks identify system operational functions.  The RBDs 
created for the flight computing architecture systems are assumed to be non-repairable and 
reflect system success dependant on one or more assemblies. The connections of these blocks 
reflect the logical behavior of the system. The RBD model does not demonstrate physical 
configuration, cannot predict mass, does not estimate power consumption, and cannot 
guarantee the reliability values demonstrated are capable of being achieved.  
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The flight computing architecture RBD predictions take into account the objectives and related 
engineering defined aspects of each system configuration without assessment of risk, but, from 
an assessment of operational success. The RBD is assembled in a success path for the 
system. The series representation indicates a system in which each block is dependent upon 
the success of the system. Parallel block configurations indicate a group of blocks that provide 
active redundancy or standby redundancy.  
 
RELEX© was used as the primary reliability modeling tool. The various flight computing 
architectures were modeled into different RBD configurations using the failure rates as identified 
in Table B1. By using the same failure rates, the only variance in results would be due to the 
RBD configurations identifying the variant in configuration of the architectures.  This allows for a 
normalized comparison of the architectures.  
 
In the RELEX© model the operation simulation (OpSim) model was used to depict the RBD’s. 
Results were calculated using Monte-Carlo simulation with 1,000,000 iterations. Confidence 
level was set at 95%. The time periods for these data analysis was provided as 12-minutes, 24-
hours, and 9-months (6480-hours).  
Cable Modeling in the Flight Computing Architecture RBD 
The different architectures were modeled with and without cabling as part of the RBD analysis. 
The request to model cabling was made in order to identify a potential difference when cabling 
is installed into the models. The cable input to the component or assembly was modeled as 
having their own (individual) failure properties. The cabling assembly RBD block was assumed 
to be comprised of the cable, supports, and connectors. The cable assembly was assumed to 
be routed from the source to the destination individually.   
Fully Cross-Strapped Switched Triplex Voter (FCSSTV) RBD 
The depiction of the FCSSTV RBD was made without cabling (Figure B-1) and with cabling 
(Figures B-2). The FCSSTV RBD identifies that the three flight computers (FC-1, FC-2, and FC-
3) are configured in a 2-of-3 redundancy configuration, which would mean that any 2 of the 3 
flight computers must be operational. The flight computers utilize a multiple 2 of the 3 switch 
configuration for success of the system. The remaining components or assemblies are arranged 
in a 1-of-2 or 2-of-3 configurations depending on the number of available units.  
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Figure B- 1. FCSSTV without Cable 
 
 
Figure B- 2. FCSSTV with Cable 
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The analysis results indication the results for FCSSTV RBD in Table B-2. 
 
 
Architecture R (12 min) R (24 hrs) R (9 months) 
FCSSTV without Cable 0.99999999951 0.999993 0.667433 
FCSSTV with Cable 0.99999999951 0.999993 0.666999 
Table B- 2. FCSSTV Results Table 
 
Partially Cross-Strapped Switched Triplex Voter (PCSSTV) RBD 
The depiction of the PCSSTV RBD was made without cabling (Figures B-3) and with cabling 
(Figures B-4). The PCSSTV RBD the three flight computers (FC-1, FC-2, and FC-3) are 
configured in a 2-of-3 redundancy configuration, which would mean that any 2 of the 3 flight 
computers must be operational. The flight computers utilize an individual 3 switch configuration. 
Each switch is dedicated to a separate group of assemblies or components. The remaining 
components or assemblies are arranged in a 1-of-2 or 2-of-3 configuration depending on the 
number of available units. 
 
 
Figure B- 3. PCSSTV without Cable 
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Figure B- 4. PCSSTV with Cable 
 
The analysis results indication the results for PCSSTV RBD in Table B-3. 
 
Architecture R (12 min) R (24 hrs) R (9 months) 
PCSSTV without Cable 0.99999999939 0.999991 0.629892 
PCSSTV with Cable 0.99999999939 0.999991 0.613596 
Table B- 3. PCSSTV Results Table 
 
Channelized Bussed Triplex Voter (CBTV) RBD 
The depiction of the CBTV RBD was made without cabling (Figures B-5) and with cabling 
(Figures B-6). The CBTV RBD identifies that the three flight computers (FC-1, FC-2, and FC-3) 
connected directly to three Cross Channel Data Links (CCDL-1, CCDL-2, and CCDL-3) and 
three Data Bus assemblies (Bus-A, Bus-B, and Bus-C) respectfully. The FC-CCDL-BUS 
assemblies are configured to a dedicated group of assemblies or components. The components 
or assemblies are arranged in a 1-of-2 or 2-of-3 configuration depending on the number of units. 
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Figure B- 5. CBTV without Cable 
 
HLV Avionics Flight Computing Architecture Study – 2011 
 
 
64 of 88 
 
 
 
Figure B- 6. CBTV with Cable 
 
The analysis results indication the results for CBTV RBD in Table B-4. 
 
Architecture R (12 min) R (24 hrs) R (9 months) 
CBTV without Cable 0.99999999856 0.999981 0.482388 
CBTV with Cable 0.99999999856 0.999979 0.464581 
Table B- 4. CBTV Results Table 
 
Fully Cross-Strapped Switched Self-Checking (FCSSC) RBD 
The depiction of the FCSSC RBD was made without cabling (Figures B-7) and with cabling 
(Figure B-8). The FCSSC RBD identifies that two pairs of flight computers (FC-1 to FC-3 and 
FC-2 to FC-4) and Cross-Channel Link (CCDL) are connected in parallel. The bus switch units 
are connected to a redundant set of bus switches. The flight computers assemblies and bus 
switch are configured to a dedicated group of assemblies or components. The components or 
assemblies are arranged in a 1-of-2 or 2-of-3 configuration depending on the number of units. 
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Figure B- 7. FCSSC without Cable 
 
 
 
Figure B- 8. FCSSC with Cable 
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The analysis results indication the results for FCSSC RBD in Table B-5. 
 
 
Architecture R (12 min) R (24 hrs) R (9 months) 
FCSSC without Cable 0.99999999946 0.999992 0.648662 
FCSSC with Cable 0.99999999946 0.999992 0.648547 
Table B- 5. FCSSC Results Table 
 
Fully Cross-Strapped Bussed Self-Checking (FCSBSC) RBD 
The depiction of the FCSBSC RBD was made without cabling (Figures B-9) and with cabling 
(Figures B-10). The FCSBSC RBD identifies that two pairs of flight computers (FC-1 to FC-3 
and FC-2 to FC-4) and Cross-Channel Link (CCDL) are connected in parallel. The flight 
computer units are connected to a redundant bus. The flight computers assemblies and bus are 
configured to a dedicated group of assemblies or components. The components or assemblies 
are arranged in a 1-of-2 or 2-of-3 configuration depending on the number of units. 
 
Figure B- 9. FCSBSC without Cable 
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Figure B- 10. FCBSC with Cable 
 
    The analysis results indication the results for FCSBSC RBD in Table B-6. 
 
Architecture R (12 min) R (24 hrs) R (9 months) 
FCSBSC without Cable 0.99999999946 0.999992 0.646862 
FCSBSC with Cable 0.99999999946 0.999992 0.646730 
Table B- 6. FCSBSC Results Table 
 
Channelized Bussed Self-Checking (CBSC) RBD 
The depiction of the CBSC RBD was made without cabling (Figures B-11) and with 
cabling (Figure B-12). The CBSC RBD identifies that two pairs of flight computers (FC-
11 & FC-12 and FC-21 & FC-22) each dependant on a Cross-Channel Link (CCDL) and 
two Data Buses. The flight computers, CCDL and bus are configured to a dedicated 
group of assemblies or components. The components or assemblies are arranged in a 
1-of-2 or 2-of-3 configuration depending on the number of units. 
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Figure B- 11. CBSC without Cable 
 
 
Figure B- 12. CBSC with Cable 
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The analysis results indication the results for CBSC RBD in Table B-7. 
 
Architecture R (12 min) R (24 hrs) R (9 months) 
CBSC without Cable 0.99998621550 0.999972 0.390913 
CBSC with Cable 0.99998621550 0.998334 0.357675 
 
Table B- 7. CBSC Results Table 
 
Summary of Flight Computing Architecture RBD 
 
The RBD analysis was performed on six architectures with and without cable. The 
summary of the results of the analysis are identified in Table B-8.  
 
Architecture R (12 min) R (24 hrs) R (9 months) 
FCSSTV without 
Cable 
0.99999999951 0.999993 0.667433 
FCSSTV with Cable 0.99999999951 0.999993 0.666999 
PCSSTV without 
Cable 
0.99999999939 0.999991 0.629892 
PCSSTV with Cable 0.99999999939 0.999991 0.613596 
CBTV without Cable 0.99999999856 0.999981 0.482388 
CBTV with Cable 0.99999999856 0.999979 0.464581 
FCSSC without Cable 0.99999999946 0.999992 0.648662 
FCSSC with Cable 0.99999999946 0.999992 0.648547 
FCSBSC without 
Cable 
0.99999999946 0.999992 0.646862 
FCSBSC with Cable 0.99999999946 0.999992 0.646730 
CBSC without Cable 0.99998621550 0.999972 0.390913 
CBSC with Cable 0.99998621550 0.998334 0.357675 
Table B- 8. Summary of RBD results 
Cut Set Analysis  
Cut set analysis provides clear indication of where the most likely failure paths would be 
depending on the accuracy of the RBD that depicts the subsystem arrangement and the 
accuracy of the failure data contained within the parts library. Once the cut sets were 
identified, a comparison was made to determine if the system with the least reliability 
contained the most failure paths, thus, making a recommendation for the most reliable 
architecture based on the number of failure paths.  It was quickly determined that, in 
general, the more cut sets an architecture had, the less reliable it tended to be.  
However, as the difference in reliability between the architectures became smaller, a 
conclusion as to the most reliable architecture could not be drawn from the number of 
cut sets alone.  Figure B-13 shows the number of cut sets related to each architecture. 
Table B-9 shows the architectures ranked from most reliable to least reliable.  
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Figure B- 13. Number of Cut Sets per Architecture without Cabling 
 
 
Architecture R (12 min) R (24 hrs) R (9 months) # Cut Sets 
FCSSTV 0.99999999951 0.999993 0.666999 21 
FCSSC 0.99999999946 0.999992 0.648547 23 
FCSBSC 0.99999999946 0.999992 0.646730 25 
PCSSTV 0.99999999939 0.999991 0.613596 51 
CBTV 0.99999999956 0.999979 0.464581 132 
CBSC 0.99998621550 0.998334 0.357675 160 
 
Table B- 9. Reliability for Architectures without Cabling Compared to Number of Cut Sets 
 
Importance Analysis  
In order to identify the individual component’s contribution to the unavailability of the 
system, the components were ranked using importance measure values. There are 
several different importance measures that can be used.  The importance measure 
value method used for this analysis was the Fussell-Vesely method.  The Fussell-Vesely 
importance measure indicates a components contribution to the system unavailability.  
Change in the failure rates of the components with high importance values (or adding 
redundancy to account for the high failure rate) will have the most significant effect on 
increasing system reliability.   
 
The implementation of the Fussell-Vesely importance measure to compare components 
within the different architectures proved somewhat more involved than typically seen.  
Most architectures contained redundancy with two or more of the same component 
functions within each; however, there was not a one-to-one correspondence. For 
example, the voter architectures contained three Flight Controllers (FCs), while the self-
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checking pair architectures contained four FCs.  Therefore, the component functions 
were grouped for comparison by summing the contributions of all like-components in the 
architecture. Table B-10 shows the example of how this was done for FCs.  Overall, 
though, this worked to determine which components were most likely to cause a failure. 
The results are shown in Figure B-14 below. 
 
 
Architecture FC-# % 
Contribution 
FC Overall FC % 
Contribution 
FCSSTV FC-1 9.12% FC 27.36% 
FC-2 9.12% 
FC-3 9.12% 
PCSSTV FC-1 6.66% FC 19.98% 
FC-2 6.66% 
FC-3 6.66% 
CBTV FC-1 15.83% FC 39.29% 
FC-2 7.63% 
FC-3 15.83% 
FCSSC FC-11 8.35% FC 33.39% 
FC-12 8.35% 
FC-21 8.35% 
FC-22 8.35% 
FCSBSC FC-11 8.51% FC 34.04% 
FC-12 8.51% 
FC-21 8.51% 
FC-22 8.51% 
CBSC FC-11 9.59% FC 43.66% 
FC-12 9.59% 
FC-21 12.24% 
FC-22 12.24% 
 
Table B- 10. Example of Component Grouping for Importance Measure Comparison 
 
 
 
HLV Avionics Flight Computing Architecture Study – 2011 
 
 
72 of 88 
 
 
Figure B- 14. Functional Element Unreliability Contribution using F-V Measure 
 
The cut set contributions and component importance measures provide the designer 
with more information than a single reliability calculation comparison may provide.  As 
architecture selection is made based not only on reliability calculations, but on weight, 
space, cost, risk to the mission, etc, and allow the designer to make more informed trade 
decisions with the most accurate data available. 
Conclusion  
In summary, reliability analyses, including Reliability Block Diagram, Cut Set Analysis 
and Importance Analysis, were performed on the architectures selected. In order for 
comparison, the same failure rates were assumed for the same types of the functional 
units and the same failure criteria were applied to all the functional units. There is no 
significant difference observed between the selected voter and self-checking 
architectures at the first order, with significant low reliability for channelized voter and 
self-checking architectures. Different distribution of the failure probability contribution 
from function units indicates different reliability improvement path for the architectures. 
Intermediate states can be modeled as a follow-on work to include the impact of 
reconfigurable and data integrity on the reliability and integrity of the architectures. 
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Appendix C: Power Analysis 
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Approach 
First we determined the individual component power specifications for all components 
utilized within the data bus network (functional units, 1553 Busses, Switches). Second, 
the team determined the number of components and calculated total integrated 
architecture power consumption using Excel. All the data was populated into Excel and 
the results graphed. The following tables present the data analysis. 
 
Table C- 1. Fully Cross-Strapped Switched Triplex Voting Architecture 
 
Device  Quantity  Ports 2 SC otherwise 1 Power (Watts) 
FC  3  3 1 136.5 
CCDL  0  N/A N/A 0 
SW  3  24 1 108 
INU  3  2 1 87 
RGA  3  2 1 108 
DAU  2  2 1 42 
ECU  2  2 1 132 
TVC  3  2 1 198 
MPS  2  2 1 72 
RCSC  2  2 1 186 
PIC  2  2 1 32 
HCU  2  2 1 742 
         
        1843.5 
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Table C- 2. Partially Cross-Strapped Switched Triplex Voting Architecture 
 
Device  Quantity  Ports 2 SC otherwise 1 Power (Watts) 
FC  3  3 1 136.5 
CCDL  0  N/A N/A 0 
SW  3  12 1 54 
INU  3  1 1 82.5 
RGA  3  1 1 103.5 
DAU  2  1 1 39 
ECU  2  1 1 129 
TVC  3  1 1 193.5 
MPS  2  1 1 69 
RCSC  2  1 1 183 
PIC  2  1 1 29 
HCU  2  1 1 739 
         
        1758 
 
Table C- 3. Channelized Bussed Triplex Voter - Ares-like 
 
Device  Quantity  Ports 2 SC otherwise 1 Power (Watts) 
FC  3  1 1 133.8 
CCDL  1  N/A N/A 18 
SW  0  0 1 0 
INU  3  1 1 88.8 
RGA  3  1 1 109.8 
DAU  2  1 1 43.2 
ECU  2  1 1 133.2 
TVC  3  1 1 199.8 
MPS  2  1 1 73.2 
RCSC  2  1 1 187.2 
PIC  2  1 1 33.2 
HCU  2  1 1 743.2 
         
        1763.4 
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Table C- 4. Full Cross-Strapped Switched Self-Checking Architecture - Orion-like 
 
Device  Quantity  Ports 2 SC otherwise 1 Power (Watts) 
FC  2  2 2 167 
CCDL  0  N/A N/A 0 
SW  2  23 2 138 
INU  3  2 2 96 
RGA  3  2 2 117 
DAU  2  2 2 48 
ECU  2  2 2 138 
TVC  3  2 2 207 
MPS  2  2 2 78 
RCSC  2  2 2 192 
PIC  2  2 2 38 
HCU  2  2 2 748 
         
        1967 
 
 
 
 
Table C- 5. Self-Checking Cross-Strapped Bus Master/Slave Architecture - Atlas-like 
 
Device  Quantity  Ports 2 SC otherwise 1 Power (Watts) 
FC  2  2 2 167 
CCDL  1  N/A N/A 18 
SW  0  0 1 0 
INU  3  2 1 99.6 
RGA  3  2 1 120.6 
DAU  2  2 1 50.4 
ECU  2  2 1 140.4 
TVC  3  2 1 210.6 
MPS  2  2 1 80.4 
RCSC  2  2 1 194.4 
PIC  2  2 1 40.4 
HCU  2  2 1 750.4 
         
        1872.2 
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Table C- 6. Self-Checking Channelized Bus 
 
Device  Quantity  Ports 2 SC otherwise 1 Power (Watts) 
FC  2  2 2 167 
CCDL  1  N/A N/A 18 
SW  0  0 1 0 
INU  3  2 2 108.6 
RGA  3  2 2 129.6 
DAU  2  2 2 56.4 
ECU  2  2 2 146.4 
TVC  3  2 2 219.6 
MPS  2  2 2 86.4 
RCSC  2  2 2 200.4 
PIC  2  2 2 46.4 
HCU  2  2 2 756.4 
         
        1935.2 
 
Assumptions 
Functional units Power (WATTS) based on prior power consumption for ARES I LRUs.  
Switch Power based on size or number of ports served. 
 
 
Conclusions 
There was no significant difference between voter and self-checking architectures for 
power consumption. 
Power results range from 1760-1970 WATTS. The 3 voter architectures had a lower 
average power margin by 136 WATTS or 7% of the highest consumer. 
 
 
Figure C- 1. Power Watts for all 6 Architectures 
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Approach 
Model a generic core stage inline heavy lift design with cores stage circular dimensions; 
(Vertical Length of 215.3’ and a Diameter 27.5’) for each architecture analyzed. Each 
model incorporates an upper stage avionics ring; lower stage/aft skirt avionics ring; and 
a specific number of functional avionic units necessary for ascent to LEO. Position 
fundamental avionic units for the upper and lower avionic rings and calculate the cable 
lengths based on the 6 fundamental architecture layouts. Analytical calculation within 
Excel to determine mass:  Graph Results. Figures D-1 through D-7, document the model 
and the process taken to determine the length and mass of cabling for the Full Crossed 
Strapped Triplex Voter. The remaining 5 other models are not included within this 
appendix however the data generated from the models are represented in the Tables D-
1 through D-6.  
 
FC1
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EFFECTOR
FC3 DU EFFECTORSwitch3
Switch2
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DU
 
Figure D- 1. Full Cross Strapped Switched Triplex Voter Layout 
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Figure below sums the lengths of cabling from the FC to the switches based on 
perimeter lengths. 
 
27.5’
System Tunnel
r=(.5*27.5’)=13.75’
1
2
FC2 to Sw1 = 43.2’
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(FC to SW)
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FC3
FC2
3
FC2 to Sw3 = 43.2’
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FC1 to Sw3 = 21.6’
 
Figure D- 2. Full Cross Strapped Switched Triplex Voter Cable Lengths. 
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Figure D- 3. Full Cross Strapped Switched Triplex Voter Input Cable Lengths. 
 
 
The model construct, placed the fundamental avionic units for the upper and lower 
avionic rings against the outer mold line and calculated the cable lengths based on the 6 
network layouts analyzed, 2 Cross Strapped,  2 Partially Cross Strapped, and 2 Single 
String. 
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Figure D- 4. Full Cross Strapped Switched Triplex Voter Aft Output Cable Lengths. 
 
 
The figure below sums all the cable lengths from each aft component to the switches. 
 
ASW1 ‐>ECU1= 21.6 + 1 = 22.6
ASW2 ‐>ECU1= 21.6 + 1 = 22.6
ASW1 ‐>ECU3= 21.6 
ASW2 ‐>ECU3= 21.6 
ASW1 ‐>ECU2= 21.6 + 1 = 22.6 
ASW2 ‐>ECU2= 21.6 + 1 = 22.6 
ASW1 ‐>ECU4= 21.6
ASW2 ‐>ECU4= 21.6
ASW1 ‐>ECU5= 43.2
ASW2 ‐>ECU5= 43.2
Total Length = 394.8’
ASW1 ‐> MPS2 = 21.6’+3’=24.6’ 
ASW2 ‐> MPS2 = 21.6’+3’=24.6’ 
ASW2 ‐> MPS1 = 21.6’+3’=24.6’
ASW1 ‐> MPS1 = 21.6’+3’=24.6’
Total Length = 147.6’
ASW2 ‐> HPU2 = 43.2’+1’=44.2’
ASW2 ‐> HPU1 = 43.2’+3’=46.2’
ASW1 ‐> HPU1 = 43.2’+3’=46.2’ 
Total Length = 271.2’
ASW1 ‐> HPU2 = 43.2’+1’=44.2’ 
Total GbE Cable length for AFT (Output) LRU’s to SW= 813.6’
ASW3 ‐>ECU1= 21.6 + 1 = 22.6
ASW3 ‐>ECU3= 21.6 
ASW3 ‐>ECU2= 21.6 + 1 = 22.6 
ASW3 ‐>ECU4= 21.6
ASW3 ‐>ECU5= 43.2
ASW3 ‐> MPS2 = 21.6’+3’=24.6’ 
ASW3 ‐> MPS1 = 21.6’+3’=24.6’
ASW2 ‐> HPU2 = 43.2’+1’=44.2’
ASW2 ‐> HPU1 = 43.2’+3’=46.2’
 
Figure D- 5. Switched Triplex Voter Aft Output Cable Length Calculations. 
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AFT SW1/2/3
FC1
FC3
FC2
RGA1
RGA3
SW1,2
Assumption: Using 1000BASE‐T Twisted‐pair cabling (Cat‐5, Cat‐5e, Cat‐6, or Cat‐7) ‐ 100 meters max drive 
length.
INU1
RGA2
Output Functions – FWD Avionics Ring (LRU’s Denoted in White)
3’
DAU1
DAU2
TVC1
TVC3
PIC2
PIC1
RSCS1
RSCS2
5’
7’
9’
3’
1’
INU2
TVC2
INU3
LRU’s
 
Figure D- 6. Full Cross Strapped Switched Triplex Voter FWD Output Cable Lengths. 
 
The figure below sums all the cable lengths from each FWD component to the switches. 
The total of all the cable lengths for each part of the model is summed. 
 
SW1 ‐>TVC1= 21.6 + 7 = 28.6’
SW2 ‐>TVC1= 21.6 + 1 = 28.6’
SW1 ‐> TVC2= 43.2 +7 = 50.2’ 
SW2 ‐> TVC2= 43.2 +7 = 50.2’ 
SW1 ‐>TVC3= 21.6 + 7 = 28.6’ 
SW2 ‐>TVC3= 21.6 + 7 = 28.6’ 
Total Length = 322.2’
SW1 ‐> RCSC2 = 21.6’+9’=30.6’
SW2 ‐> RCSC2 = 21.6’+9’=30.6’
SW2 ‐> RCSC1 = 21.6’+9’=30.6’ 
SW1 ‐> RCSC1 = 21.6’+9’=30.6’
Total Length = 183.6’
SW2 ‐> PIC2 = 21.6’+3’=24.6’ 
SW2 ‐> PIC1 = 21.6’+3’=24.6’ 
SW1 ‐> PIC1 = 21.6’+3’=24.6’ 
Total Length = 147.6’
SW1 ‐> PIC2 = 21.6’+3’=24.6’ 
Total GbE Cable length for FWD (Output) LRU’s to SW= 653.4’
Total GbE Cable length for Full Switched Voter = 259.2’ + 862.2’ + 2196.9’+ 813.6’ + 653.4’= 
4785.5’
Nominal Weight of CAT‐5e (1000BASE‐T) = 22lbs/1000’ ‐> Weight Cabling = 105.27 lbs 
(Minus Connectors weight) 
SW3 ‐>TVC3= 21.6 + 7 = 28.6’ 
SW3 ‐> TVC2= 43.2 +7 = 50.2’ 
SW3 ‐>TVC1= 21.6 + 1 = 28.6’
SW3 ‐> RCSC2 = 21.6’+9’=30.6’
SW3 ‐> RCSC1 = 21.6’+9’=30.6’ 
SW3 ‐> PIC2 = 21.6’+3’=24.6’ 
SW3 ‐> PIC1 = 21.6’+3’=24.6’ 
 
 
Figure D- 7. Full Cross Strapped Switched Triplex Voter FWD Output Cable Length 
Calculations. 
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Finally, all of the cable lengths for the independent architecture components are inserted 
into an Excel calculation and the mass is determined. The results are as follows: 
 
 
Table D- 1. Full Switched Triplex Voter Mass Calculations 
Flight Computer 1/2/3 To Switch 1/2/3   259.2
         
Upper Stage Inputs       
Switch 1/2/3 to RGA 1/2/3     268.8
Switch 1/2/3 to INU 1/2/3     433.9
Switch 1/2/3 to DAU 1/2    159.6
Total        862.3
         
Upper Stage Outputs     
Switch 1/2/3 to TVC 1/2/3    322.2
Switch 1/2/3 to RCS 1/2    183.6
Switch 1/2/3 to PIC 1/2    147.6
Total        653.4
         
System Tunnel Cabling    2196.9
         
Aft Output Function       
Switch 1/2/3 to ECU 1/2/3/4/5    394.8
Switch 1/2/3/ to MPS 1/2    147.6
Switch 1/2/3 HPU1/2    271.2
Total        813.6
         
Total Cable Length (ft)      4785.4
Total Cable Weight (lbs)      105.2788
Normalized Percent      100
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Table D- 2. Partially Switched Triplex Voter Mass Calculations 
Flight Computer 1/2/3 To Switch 1/2/4   259.2
         
Upper Stage Inputs       
Switch 1/2/3 to RGA 1/2/3     89.4
Switch 1/2/3 to INU 1/2/3     144
Switch 1/2/3 to DAU 1/2    53.2
Total        286.6
         
Upper Stage Outputs     
Switch 1/2/3 to TVC 1/2/3    107.4
Switch 1/2/3 to RCS 1/2    61.2
Switch 1/2/3 to PIC 1/2    49.2
Total        217.8
         
System Tunnel Cabling    905.1
         
Aft Output Function       
Switch 1/2/3 to ECU 1/2/3/4/5    131.6
Switch 1/2/3/ to MPS 1/2    49.2
Switch 1/2/3 HPU1/2    90.4
Total        271.2
         
Total Cable Length (ft)      1939.9
Total Cable Weight (lbs)      42.6778
Normalized Percent      40.53789
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Table D- 3. Bussed Triplex Voter Mass Calculations 
Flight Computer 1/2/3 To BUS 1/2/3  259.2
         
Upper Stage Inputs       
Bus 1/2/3 to RGA 1/2/3    3
Bus 1/2/3 to INU 1/2/3    15
Bus 1/2/3 to DAU 1/2    10
Total        28
         
Upper Stage Outputs     
Bus 1/2/3 to TVC 1/2/3     23
BUS 1/2/3 to RCS 1/2    18
BUS 1/2/3 to PIC 1/2      6
Total        47
         
System Tunnel Cabling    645.9
         
Aft Busses 1/2/3      259.2
         
Aft Output Function       
Bus 1/2/3to ECU 1/2/3/4/5    9
Bus 1/2/3 to MPS 1/2    10
Bus 1/2/3 to HPU1/2      6
Total        25
         
Total Cable Length (ft)      1264.3
Total Cable Weight (lbs)      15.80375
Total Weight with Couplers (lbs)    19.80375
Normalized Percent      18.81077
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Table D- 4. SCP Full Cross Strapped Switched Mass Calculations 
Flight Computer 1/2/3 To Switch 1/2  86.4
         
Upper Stage Inputs       
Switch 1/2 to RGA 1/2/3     178.8
Switch 1/2 to INU 1/2/3     289.2
Switch 1/2 to DAU 1/2    106.4
Total        574.4
         
Upper Stage Outputs     
Switch 1/2/3 to TVC 1/2/3    214.8
Switch 1/2/3 to RCS 1/2    122.4
Switch 1/2/3 to PIC 1/2    98.4
Total        435.6
         
System Tunnel Cabling to Aft Switch  947.6
         
Aft Output Function       
Switch 1/2/3 to ECU 1/2/3/4/5    263.2
Switch 1/2/3/ to MPS 1/2    98.4
Switch 1/2/3 HPU1/2    180.8
Total        542.4
         
Total Cable Length (ft)      2586.4
Total Cable Weight (lbs)      56.9008
Normalized Percent      54.04773
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Table D- 5. SCP Cross Strapped Bussed Mass Calculations 
Flight Computer 1/2 To BUS 1/2/  172.8
         
Upper Stage Inputs       
Bus 1/2 to RGA 1/2/3    6
Bus 1/2 to INU 1/2/3      30
Bus 1/2 to DAU 1/2      20
Total        56
         
Upper Stage Outputs     
Bus 1/2/3 to TVC 1/2/3     46
BUS 1/2/3 to RCS 1/2    36
BUS 1/2/3 to PIC 1/2      12
Total        94
         
System Tunnel Cabling    430.6
         
Aft Busses 1/2/3      172.8
         
Aft Output Function       
Bus 1/2/3to ECU 1/2/3/4/5    18
Bus 1/2/3 to MPS 1/2    20
Bus 1/2/3 to HPU1/2      16
Total        54
         
Total Cable Length (ft)      980.2
Total Cable Weight (lbs)      12.2525
Total Weight with Couplers (lbs)    16.2525
Normalized Percent      15.43758
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Table D- 6. SCP Channelized Bussed Mass Calculations 
Flight Computer 1/2 To BUS 1/2/  345.6
         
Upper Stage Inputs       
Bus 1A/1B,2A/2B to RGA 1/2/3    8
Bus 1A/1B,2A/2B to INU 1/2/3    40
Bus 1A/1B,2A/2B to DAU 1/2    20
Total        68
         
Upper Stage Outputs     
Bus 1A/1B,2A/2B to TVC 1/2/3     64
Bus 1A/1B,2A/2B to RCS 1/2    36
Bus 1A/1B,2A/2B to PIC 1/2    12
Total        112
         
System Tunnel Cabling    861.2
         
Aft Busses 1/2/3      345.6
         
Aft Output Function       
Bus 1A/1B,2A/2B to ECU 1/2/3/4/5  36
Bus 1A/1B,2A/2B to MPS 1/2    20
Bus 1A/1B,2A/2B to HPU1/2    16
Total        72
         
Total Cable Length (ft)      1804.4
Total Cable Weight (lbs)      22.555
Total Weight with Couplers (lbs)    28.555
Normalized Percent      27.12322
 
Assumptions 
No additional avionics or functional units for boosters or 2nd stage/payloads were 
considered for the analysis. The model utilized 1000BASE-T Twisted-pair cabling (Cat-5, 
Cat-5e, Cat-6, or Cat-7) at a 100 meter max drive length for the architectures that 
utilized a switched network. The model utilized 1553 cabling as the bus for the bussed 
architectures 
 
Conclusions 
Mass ranges determined were between 16 lbs to 105lbs, which is 2% to 9% percent of 
the total estimated cable/harness weight for a heavy lift vehicle (Approx 1200lbs)*.  
Cable weight was a function of cross strapping and not a function of the Flight Computer 
(SCP vs Voter).  
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Figure D- 8. Data cabling mass summary 
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